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There are things we know, things we know we don’t know, and then there are things we don’t
know we don’t know. In this paper we address the latter two issues in a Bayesian framework,
introducing the notion of doubt to quantify the degree of (dis)belief in a model given observational
data in the absence of explicit alternative models. We demonstrate how a properly calibrated doubt
can lead to model discovery when the true model is unknown.
I. INTRODUCTION
Given two or more competing models to describe
observed data, Bayesian model comparison offers a
way of determining the preferred model given the
data and explicit assumptions about prior beliefs.
The key feature of Bayesian model comparison is
that it implements Occam’s razor, by selecting the
model that optimally balances quality–of–fit and
high model predictivity. (See [1] for an introduction.)
Given a set of known models, however, the Bayesian
framework usually has little to say about the abso-
lute quality–of–fit of the preferred model. This is be-
cause the underlying philosophy is that there is little
virtue in rejecting a model if no better alternative is
present.
In the frequentist approach, a popular (abso-
lute) measure of the goodness–of–fit is given by the
χ2–per–degree–of–freedom (χ2/dof) rule–of–thumb,
where χ2 is (twice) the best–fit log–likelihood. For
normally distributed data points, χ2/dof is dis-
tributed as a χ2 distribution. Therefore, if the model
is appropriate for the data, one expects that χ2/
dof≈ 1. An unsatisfactory fit is signaled by χ2/
dof≫ 1, while χ2/dof≪ 1 usually implies overfitting,
hence a model overspecification. Complementary
to this, principle component analysis (PCA) can be
used to determine the maximal number of parameters
a given observational data set can reasonably con-
strain [2]. Diagonalizing the covariance matrix of the
parameters and determining how many eigenvalues
are below a given threshold gives an upper limit on
the number of parameters that are well–constrained
by observations, preventing the use of a too–general
model. The Bayesian framework replaces this with
the notion of model complexity, see [3].
In the Bayesian framework, the question of
whether the preferred model describes the observa-
tions “well enough” can be phrased as follows: what
is the degree of belief that there are no other “reason-
able” models that would better describe the observa-
tions? Historically, the need for fundamentally new
physics has often been driven by a poor fit between
data and existing models, at a point where an explicit
alternative was not available. For example, the devel-
opment of General Relativity was driven in part by
the need to explain a single number – the anomalous
perihelion precession rate of Mercury. The increasing
complexity of data makes it harder to simply eval-
uate discrepancies between theory and experiment
and decide on their significance. In light of the in-
creasing usage of Bayesian statistical techniques, like
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms, it
would be advantageous to develop a reliable mea-
sure of confidence in the best–fit model that can deal
with today’s large data sets and multi–dimensional
parameter spaces. This is particularly true in the
cosmological context, which faces unique difficulties –
some observations are now so advanced as to be con-
strained by fundamental limitations on the quality
of data (cosmic variance). Thus, cosmologists must
take particular care to extract the maximum amount
of information from available measurements.
Our confidence in the (absolute) adequacy of the
best model can only be determined under general
assumptions about any hypothetical better fitting
model. In this paper, we propose a set of assump-
tions for such a model, define the notion of statistical
doubt and illustrate its use by computing the doubt
for a toy linear model. In a future work, we will apply
this tool to evaluate the current concordance model
of cosmology.
First, we give a short review of Bayesian model
selection. We introduce the notion of doubt, then
discuss a technique for the calibration of the level of
false doubt and demonstrate the usefulness of doubt
for model discovery in an application to a toy linear
model. Finally, we present our conclusions.
2II. BAYESIAN MODEL SELECTION
In this section, we briefly review Bayesian model
selection. For more details we refer the reader to
[1]. From Bayes’ theorem, the posterior probability
of modelMj given the data d, p(Mj|d), is related to
the Bayesian evidence (or model likelihood) p(d|Mj)
by
p(Mj |d) = p(d|Mj)p(Mj)
p(d)
, (1)
where p(Mj) is the prior belief in model Mj . Here
and in the following, “model” denotes a choice of
theory, with specification of its free parameters, θj ,
and of their prior probability distribution, p(θj |Mj).
The specification of the prior might be somewhat
ambiguous for models with continuous free param-
eters, especially when one is working with an effec-
tive parameterisation only loosely tied to the under-
lying physics. (For further discussion of these points,
see [4] and, for a critical view, [5]). In Eq. (1),
p(d) =
∑
i p(d|Mi)p(Mi) is a normalisation constant
(where the sum runs over all available known models
Mi, i = 1, . . . , N) and
p(d|Mj) =
∫
dθ p(d|θj ,Mj)p(θj |Mj) (2)
is the Bayesian evidence, where p(d|θj ,Mj) is the
likelihood.
Given two competing models, M0 and M1, the
Bayes factor B01 is the ratio of the models’ evidences
B01 ≡ p(d|M0)
p(d|M1) , (3)
where large values of B01 denote a preference for
M0, and small values of B01 denote a preference for
M1. The “Jeffreys’ scale” (Table I) gives an empiri-
cal prescription for translating the values of B01 into
strengths of belief.
Given two or more models, specified in terms of
their parameterisation and priors on the parame-
| lnB01| Odds Strength of evidence
< 1.0 ∼
< 3 : 1 Inconclusive
1.0 ∼ 3 : 1 Weak evidence
2.5 ∼ 12 : 1 Moderate evidence
5.0 ∼ 150 : 1 Strong evidence
TABLE I: Empirical scale for evaluating the strength of
evidence when comparing two models, M0 versus M1
(so–called “Jeffreys’ scale”, here slightly modified follow-
ing the prescriptions given in [1, 6]). The right–most col-
umn gives our convention for denoting the different levels
of evidence above these thresholds.
ters, it is straightforward (although sometimes com-
putationally challenging) to compute the Bayes fac-
tor. Depending on the problem at hand, semi–
analytical [7, 8] and numerical [9, 10, 11] techniques
are available. In the usual case where the prior
of the models is taken to be non–committal (i.e.,
p(Mj) = 1/N), the model with the largest Bayes fac-
tor ought to be preferred. Thus the computation of
B01 allows to select one (or a few) promising model(s)
from a set of known models. However, it contains
no information about whether the selected model is
actually a good explanation for the data. This in-
formation is contained in p(Mj|d). From Eq. (1), it
is clear that a correct computation of p(Mj|d) re-
quires the denominator p(d) to be computed from a
reasonably complete sum of models.
We now turn to the question of how to evaluate
our absolute degree of belief in the adequacy of a set
of known models.
III. BAYESIAN DOUBT
A. Introducing doubt
In light of the observations in the previous section,
we seek to capitalise on the information in p(Mj |d).
We introduce the concept of doubt D to describe in a
quantitative way our degree of (dis)belief in the abil-
ity of any known model in a listMi (i = 1, . . . , N) to
describe the data. We begin by expanding our space
of models to include an as–yet unknown model X ,
which represents the possibility that the collection of
models presently under consideration is incomplete
and that there might be a “better” (in a Bayesian
sense) model that we have not yet identified. We
then define the doubt D = D({Mi}|d) as the poste-
rior probability of the unknown model, p(X|d), which
from Bayes’ theorem is given by
D ≡ p(X|d) = p(d|X )p(X )
p(d)
=
1
1 +
∑
i
p(d|Mi)p(Mi)
p(d|X )p(X )
, (4)
where the sum runs over the known models, i =
1, . . . , N . The prior for the unknown model is
p(X ) = 1−
N∑
i=1
p(Mi) . (5)
Given some openness about the possibility that our
list of known models is incomplete, and given an es-
timate of the Bayesian evidence p(d|X ) for X , the
doubt expresses the posterior probability that the
list of models Mi is missing a model that is a bet-
ter description of the available data. If p(X ) > 0,
3then “sufficiently poor evidence” for the known mod-
els Mi (i.e., p(d|Mi) ≪ p(d|X )) will instill enough
doubt to question the appropriateness of Mi. Obvi-
ously, assuming a priori that the known models ex-
haust the model space, i.e. p(X ) = 0, would leave no
room for doubt: D = 0 independent of the evidence
p(d|X ).
The crucial step in evaluating the doubt is esti-
mating the evidence for the unknown model, p(d|X ).
Clearly this quantity cannot be computed using
Eq. (2), as this would require the unknown model
to be fully specified in terms of its parameters and
priors. If this was possible, then X could be included
in the list of Mi and would not be unknown in the
first place.
Fortunately, even without an explicitly specified
mode, but given the data d, we can produce an in-
formed guess as to what the evidence for a “good”
model should be. If the evidences of the models on
the table,Mi, are poor compared to this value, then
the Bayes factors in favour of the unknown model
Bxi ≡ p(d|X )
p(d|Mi) ≫ 1 , (6)
and as consequently (see Eq. (4)) the posterior prob-
ability of doubt will increase.
What we are suggesting is in fact a calibration of
the absolute value of the evidence. Bayesian model
comparison focuses on the Bayes factor, which in-
dicates the change of our relative confidence in the
models in light of the observed data. Since the Bayes
factor is the ratio of the models’ evidences, the abso-
lute value of the evidence itself is usually deemed
irrelevant. (This is only actually strictly true for
nested models, where the normalisation of the ev-
idence drops out of the ratio.) A shortcoming of
ignoring the absolute value of the evidence is that
the model comparison will always return a preferred
model, even in cases when all of the available models
fit the data poorly. The notion of doubt is designed
to remedy this obviously unsatisfactory situation, by
introducing a Bayesian way of dealing with the con-
cept of absolute quality of fit. This is a familiar con-
cept from the usual frequentist goodness–of–fit tests,
which have the advantage of flagging strong discrep-
ancies between the model and the observed data. In-
tuitively, it is sensible that we should start doubting
the adequacy of our model(s) whenever the observed
data are in poor agreement with their predictions.
An appropriately calibrated absolute value of the ev-
idence can be employed within a Bayesian-style rea-
soning to substantiate our intuition that “something
fishy” must be going on whenever the data are a poor
fit to the best model available.
B. Calibration of the evidence
The absolute upper bound on the value of the evi-
dence for the unknown model is achieved for a model
S which predicts exactly the data that have been ob-
served (and which has a prior that goes to zero for
any other observation). Such a model can be dubbed
a “sure–thing model”, because it is totally determin-
istic. However, in most situations of interest, such a
model is unrealistic, because it does not allow for
the statistical nature of the measurement process,
which is subject to noise, neither does it accommo-
date a possible statistical connection between the ob-
servables and the underlying physical model, which
introduces sample variance in certain contexts (e.g.
cosmic variance in cosmology). Furthermore (as dis-
cussed in [12] for the conceptually simple case of coin
tossing), such models are usually thrown out from the
beginning, simply because there is a large number of
them: e.g. for any outcome of N coin flips, there
are 2N different sure–thing models Si “predicting”
exactly the data that might have been observed. Be-
cause of their large number, each of the Si should be
penalised by a prior probability p(Si) ∼ 2−N , which
goes quickly to 0 for even moderate values of N . For
all those reasons, calibrating off the absolute maxi-
mum value of the evidence is undesirable. A more
realistic calibration is required.
We suggest to calibrate the evidence using the
properties of the likelihood and a default (weak) ref-
erence prior. The first step is to approximate the
evidence for the unknown model, p(d|X ), via the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [1, 13, 14, 15,
16], the derivation of which we sketch below (see
e.g. [14] for further details).
Let us denote the likelihood of the unknown model
by L(θ) ≡ p(d|θ,X ) and the prior by p(θ|X ). We
begin by Taylor expanding g(θ) = ln [L(θ)p(θ|X )]
around the maximum likelihood value, θmax. To sec-
ond order,
g(θ) ≈ g(θmax)− 1
2
(θ − θmax)tH(θ − θmax), (7)
where H is minus the Hessian matrix evaluated at
the maximum likelihood point,
Hab ≡ − ∂
2g(θ)
∂θa∂θb
∣∣∣
θ=θmax
. (8)
Using this approximation in the calculation of the
evidence, Eq. (2), we obtain
ln p(d|X ) = lnLmax + ln p(θmax|X ) + k
2
ln(2π) (9)
− 1
2
ln |H |+O(n−1) ,
4where k is the number of parameters in the un-
known model. For large samples, we can approxi-
mate H ≈ nI (to order O(n−1/2)), where I is the ex-
pected Fisher matrix from a single observation. We
now assume that the (unknown) prior p(θ|X ) is a
multivariate Gaussian approximately centred at θmax
with Fisher matrix I. This means that the assumed
prior distribution contains about the same (weak)
information as would an average single observation.
Then
ln p(θmax|X ) = −k
2
ln(2π) +
1
2
ln |I|. (10)
Plugging this reference prior into (9) and with the
above approximation for H , terms of order O(1) can-
cel and we obtain
ln p(d|X ) = lnLmax − k
2
lnn+O(n−1/2). (11)
This is the standard expression for the BIC, which
we will employ to estimate the evidence for the un-
known model. It requires an estimate of the best–fit
likelihood Lmax and of the number of free parame-
ters, k, for the unknown model X . Notice that the
likelihood, when normalised over the data space, is
a dimensionful quantity, with dimensions [data]−n.
In the following we will always drop such a prefactor
(and the associated factors of 2π) as it always cancels
when considering evidence ratios (for the same data),
therefore Lmax has to be regarded as dimensionless.
In order to compute the evidence for the unknown
model from Eq. (11), we need to specify an estima-
tor L̂max ≡ −2 ln L̂max for (minus twice) the best–
fit log–likelihood, −2 lnLmax, of the unknown model
X . This can be obtained from the requirement of
“typicality” of the observed realization under X .
Assuming that the data are normally distributed,
−2 lnLmax follows an approximate χ2-distribution
with m = (n − k) degrees of freedom. Then the
expectation value of Lmax (as taken over different
realizations of the data, represented by 〈·〉) follows
from
〈−2 lnLmax〉 = m. (12)
Employing 〈−2 lnLmax〉 as an estimator for
−2 lnLmax would be equivalent to assuming that the
unknown model has χ2/dof= 1, in agreement with
the rule–of–thumb for goodness–of–fit tests. This
however is too harsh a requirement on the perfor-
mance of the known models Mi. Even if one of the
known models is indeed the correct one, the real-
ized maximum likelihood value for that model will
be smaller than the estimator (i.e. −2 lnLobsmax <
〈−2 lnLmax〉) in about 50% of realizations of the data
(for the median and the mean of the chi–square dis-
tribution are very close). This would lead in many
cases to unjustified doubt of the correct model as
a consequence of harmless statistical fluctuations in
the observed data realization.
Therefore, instead of using the expectation value,
the value of Lmax should be more conservatively esti-
mated so that for example, −2 lnLobsmax < L̂max only
in 100α% of the data realizations, where we are free
to choose the value of α. This can be achieved by
taking L̂max to be the α quantile χ
2
m,(α) of the chi–
square distribution with m dof, Pχ2m , L̂max = χ
2
m,(α),
defined through∫ ∞
χ2
m,(α)
Pχ2m(x)dx = 1− α . (13)
As χ2m,(α) increases monotonically with α, larger
values of α lead to smaller (and hence more
conservative) values for the evidence p(d|X ) ∝
exp(−χ2m,(α)/2) via Eq. (11). In principle, one is free
to choose the value of α, and we calibrate it by de-
manding the wrongful rejection rate of correct mod-
els to be smaller than a given value γ (see Tables II
and III below).
In summary, we suggest to use as an estimator of
the unknown model’s evidence,
ln p(d|X , k, α) = −
χ2m,(α)
2
− k
2
lnn , (14)
where on the left–hand side we have conditioned ex-
plicitly on the number of parameters k of X , and on
the quantile value α.
In a Bayesian spirit, one could treat k and α as hy-
perparameters, by specifying a prior and marginal-
ising over them in the evidence. Here, we investi-
gate the behaviour of doubt in a Gaussian linear toy
model, where k is fixed at a plausible value and α
is chosen by calibrating its value on the fraction of
cases where doubt wrongfully grows.
C. Change in the amount of doubt:
independence of prior doubt
The final quantity that needs to be specified in or-
der to compute the posterior doubt is the prior doubt,
p(X ). It seems to us that values 10−5 ∼< p(X ) ∼< 10−1
might be plausible in many cases of interest, but
higher or lower values are certainly possible. The in-
teresting question is in fact whether doubt increases
or decreases in the light of the observed data. We as-
sume that the prior probability of the known models
is equally split among them, i.e.
p(M1) = p(M2) = · · · = p(MN ) = 1− p(X )
N
.
(15)
5(This simplifying assumption can easily be relaxed.)
This leads to the following expression for the relative
change between the prior and posterior doubt:
R ≡ D
p(X ) =
p(X|d, k, α)
p(X ) (16)
=
[
p(X ) + (1− p(X )) Σ¯
e−χ
2
m,(α)
/2n−k/2
]−1
,
where we have defined the average known models’
evidence
Σ¯ ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
p(d|Mi). (17)
The doubt grows if R > 1, i.e. for
Σ¯
e
−χ2
m,(α)
/2
n−k/2
< 1, (18)
independently of the prior probability for doubt (as
long as this is strictly greater than zero).
Let us consider the asymptotic behaviour of the
criterion given by Eq. (18) for a large number of
data points, both under the assumption that the true
model is present in and the assumption that it is ab-
sent from the list of known models.
If the true model MT is within the list Mi, then
by construction of the BIC
lim
n→∞
p(d|MT ) = e−BIC/2 = e−χ
2
m,(0.5)/2n−k/2 ,
(19)
hence to leading order
Σ¯
e
−χ2
m,(α)
/2
n−k/2
→ 1
N
exp(∆α/2) . (20)
Here ∆α ≡ χ2m,(α)−χ2m,(0.5), with χ2m,(α) the inverse
of the χ2 cumulative distribution function (CDF)
with m degrees of freedom. Clearly, ∆α > 0 for
α > 0.5. In the limit of many data points, n→∞ (or
equivalently m → ∞), χ2m,(α) can be approximated
by the inverse of the CDF of the normal distribution
with mean m and variance 2m, N (m, 2m), so that
lim
n→∞
∆α = m×
(
2
√
2 InverseErf(2α− 1)
)
, (21)
where InverseErf(x) is the inverse of the Error Func-
tion. It follows that ∆α ≫ 1 and therefore from
(20) and (16) for many data points n (or degrees of
freedom m), R → 0, and hence D → 0. In other
words: if the true model is in the list of known mod-
els, the doubt goes to zero as expected. Notice that
in Eq. (20) the extra factor 1/N of penalising for the
true model comes from the fact that its predictivity
has been spread among a set of N possibilities. More
precisely, the 1/N factor assumes that the evidences
for the other known models are negligible in the sum.
However, if there areM < N other models which are
unnecessarily more complicated than the true model
with parameters that are unconstrained by the data,
one would expect that the evidence for each of those
models is of the same order as for the true model (be-
cause the evidence does not penalise unconstrained
parameters). Therefore the 1/N factor would be re-
placed by a factor ∼ (M + 1)/N .
If, instead, the true model (or another model that
is about as good as the true model in explaining the
data) is not within the list of known models, then
the numerator in Eq. (18) will drop very quickly to
zero, hence
lim
n→∞
R = 1
p(X ) . (22)
Therefore the doubt goes to unity, D → 1, which
leads to questioning the completeness of our list of
known models.
Further modelling requires the explicit specifica-
tion of the known models and computation of Σ¯ from
the observed data. We therefore proceed with an il-
lustration based on linear models.
IV. ILLUSTRATION: LINEAR TOY MODEL
It is instructive to look at an example for the usage
of doubt in a simple toy model. Consider the case of
a Gaussian linear model:
y = Aθ + ǫ , (23)
where the dependent variable y is a n-dimensional
vector of observations, θ is a vector of dimension c
of unknown regression coefficients and A is a n × c
matrix of known constants which specify the rela-
tion between the input variables θ and the dependent
variables y. Furthermore, ǫ is a n-dimensional vector
of random variables with zero mean (the noise). We
assume that the observations are independent identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.), hence ǫ follows a multivari-
ate Gaussian distribution with unit covariance and
the likelihood is given by
L(θ) = exp
[
−1
2
n∑
i=1
(
yi − ythi
σ
)2]
, (24)
where yi(y
th
i ) are the values of the observed (pre-
dicted) observables, and σ = 1.
For the purpose of our example, let us assume that
we have n data points, and that two models are avail-
able:
• M0 : y = θ, i.e. c = 1 and A = (1, . . . , 1)t and
6FIG. 1: Distribution of doubt values when the correct
model is used to fit the data, for 1000 realizations of 100
data points, for prior doubt p(X ) = 10−1 (blue, dashed)
and p(X ) = 10−5 (red, solid), and α = 0.95.
• M1 : y = θx, i.e. c = 1 and A = (x1, . . . , xn)t .
In both cases there is one free parameter, θ, and
we will assume that a prior is available of the form
p(θ|M0) = p(θ|M1) = 1/4 for θ ∈ [−2, 2] (and van-
ishes outside that range). We will assume that there
is one free parameter in the unknown model, i.e.
k = 1. (The number of effective free parameters can
be investigated further by the mean of the Bayesian
complexity, see [3].)
We are interested in investigating the behaviour of
the ratio of the posterior to the prior doubt R. We
expect R < 1 (decreasing doubt) when the known
model is the correct underlying distribution, and
R > 1 when an incorrect known model is used. For
definiteness, we will take the true model to be M1,
with θtrue = 0.1.
A. Doubt when fitting data with the correct
model: false doubt
Let us assume that our list of known models con-
tains only M1 (i.e. N = 1 and M0 is not on the
list). We first fit the dataset (generated from M1)
with the correct modelM1 and we compute the pos-
terior p(M1|d) and the doubt p(X|d) from Eq. (4),
using α = 0.95 In this case, there should be no reason
for doubt as we expectM1 to be an adequate descrip-
tion of the data. We show the ensuing distribution of
posterior doubt in Fig. 1 (from 1000 data realizations
with n = 100 data points each), for two different
choices of prior doubt, p(X ) = 10−5 (red/solid his-
togram) and p(X ) = 10−1 (blue/dashed histogram).
The posterior doubt of the vast majority of the re-
alizations is smaller than the prior doubt, consistent
with expectations. Clearly, the absolute value of the
posterior doubt depends on the choice of prior doubt,
and quite reasonably so. If a priori one is quite cer-
tain that the model is correct, then small deviations
from a perfect fit will not shake one’s belief in the
model. However, if the prior doubt is relatively large,
p(X ) = 10−1 (i.e., if a priori one is quite uncertain
that the model being used is correct) then already
small fluctuations in the data will lead to relatively
strong posterior doubt. The less confident one is to
begin with, the more easily one’s belief in a model is
shaken by statistical fluctuations. In any case, larger
amounts of data will lessen the effect of fluctuations,
leading to little doubt about the correct model, with
the amount of data required for persuasion depen-
dent on the prior doubt. For both values of prior
doubt in Fig. 1, about 14% of the realizations lead to
a posterior doubt that is larger than the prior doubt.
This number is independent of the prior doubt as can
be seen from Eq. (16) and decreases with increasing
number of data points n and as α approaches unity.
We call realizations that incorrectly give an increase
of doubt (although the model being used is the cor-
rect one) cases of “false doubt”.
We now turn to investigate the relative change in
doubt, R, which is plotted in Fig. 2, for two choices
of the number of data points n and of the calibration
parameter α. Recall that logR > 0 (< 0) corre-
sponds to an increase (decrease) in doubt in light of
the observed data. In fact, R can be regarded as a
sort of “Bayes factor” for doubt change — it gives
the relative change in our “state of doubt” after we
have seen the data. While the actual value of R is
dependent on the prior doubt, the threshold sepa-
rating increasing doubt from decreasing doubt (i.e.,
logR = 0) is independent of p(X ). As expected, a
larger number of data points leads to a decrease in
the fraction of realizations for which doubt wrong-
fully grows (values logR > 0). The same is true if
one increases α. As explained above, this is because
a larger value of α leads to a less harsh penalty for
odd features in the realized data.
By construction of the doubt, there is a strong
correlation between the value of logR and the chi–
square per dof of the best fit. This is depicted in
Fig. 3. First, it is obvious that for a given choice
of α, data realizations leading to a wrongful increase
in doubt (logR > 0) are the ones that present “un-
lucky” features, i.e. the ones with a large value of
χ2/dof. In other words, cases of false doubt would
be suspicious even using a more traditional measure
of the quality of fit. However, the second, crucial
7FIG. 2: Distribution of the change in doubt logR when
fitting data with the correct model, from 1000 data real-
izations for n = 5, α = 0.95 (blue/solid, thin), n = 5, α =
0.99 (red/dashed, thin), n = 100, α = 0.95 (blue/solid,
thick) and n = 100, α = 0.99 (red/dashed, thick). Val-
ues logR < 0 correspond to a decrease in the amount of
doubt. A larger value of α and a larger number of data
points n lead to a reduction of the number of cases where
the doubt wrongly grows (values logR > 0).
point is that the parameter α can be calibrated in
order to achieve a pre–determined fraction of false
doubt from a known model. By increasing α, the lo-
cus of the realizations shifts to the left of the plot.
Therefore one can choose α in such a way that the
probability of false doubt is below a given threshold.
This is discussed in the next section.
B. Calibration of the level of false doubt
As shown above, some fraction of data realizations
will always lead to false doubt. This fraction depends
on the value of α and on the number of data points,
n, but not on the level of prior doubt. (There is a
further, if subdominant, dependence on k.)
For a given number of data points, it is desir-
able to tune the value of α such that the fraction of
false doubt γ is (on average) below a predetermined
threshold. This is achieved as follows. Starting from
the model distribution (here, M1), we employ cur-
rent data to derive constraints on its free parameters,
as usual in the inference step. We then select an es-
timator θˆ for the value of the parameters (here, θ),
which will usually be either the best–fit point or the
posterior mean. We simulate 104 realizations of the
FIG. 3: Correlation between the “chi–square–per–dof”
rule and the change in doubt, logR, for different values
of the calibration parameter α, increasing from right to
left (for 1000 data realizations). The parameter α can
be chosen so that only a pre–determined fraction γ of
data realizations lie in the “false doubt” zone (shaded,
logR > 0). Here, α has been chosen in such a way that
(from right to left) γ = 0.50, 0.05, 0.01.
data from the model, assuming a fiducial value θˆ for
its parameters. We then compute the doubt for each
realization, and calibrate the value of α by requir-
ing that the fraction of realizations with logR > 0
be below a value γ [18]. To further reduce the scat-
ter in α, we average over the resulting α values from
1000 such procedures. Table II shows such values of
α(γ, n,M1) for a few representative choices of γ and
n. One striking feature of the calibration table is
that the value of α required for a false doubt rate γ
is systematically much larger than 1− γ. This is an-
other reflection of the well known fact that how likely
the data are given the hypothesis does not by itself
determine how probable the hypothesis is given the
data. Inferring the latter requires the use of Bayes
theorem. (For an in–depth discussion of this point,
see [6]).
Because the calibrated value of α decreases mono-
tonically with increasing n, the above calibration
procedure, once carried out for a certain number of
data points, is expected to be conservative when the
amount of data increases. This is shown in Fig. 4,
where we plot the fraction of realizations leading to
false doubt after α has been calibrated at n = 100.
We can see that for n > 100 the fraction of false
doubt remains below the calibrated level, and that
8n γ = 0.01 γ = 0.05 γ = 0.50
10 0.99969(3) 0.9980(1) 0.9550(8)
100 0.9980(2) 0.9869(7) 0.747(4)
200 0.9968(3) 0.9810(9) 0.684(4)
1000 0.9942(6) 0.968(1) 0.586(5)
TABLE II: Values of α(γ, n,M1), as a function of the
number of data points, n, ensuring an average fraction of
false doubt of γ = 1%, 5%, 50% and for model distribution
M1. The number in brackets denotes the uncertainty in
the last digit.
FIG. 4: Fraction of cases of false doubt, logR > 0 as
a function of the number of data points, n, employing a
doubt calibration parameter α corresponding to a false
doubt probability of γ = 5% (dashed red) and γ = 1%
(solid blue) for n = 100. For a number of data points
n > 100 there is a residual (if mild) n dependence in the
fraction of false doubt, which however is always below
the calibration level. The calibration is independent of
the prior doubt.
the residual n dependency is fairly mild.
C. Doubt when fitting data with an incorrect
model: model discovery
We now pretend that the true model where the
data come from, M1, is unknown to us. We take
M0 to be the only known model, and consequently
fit the data with it. We repeat the calibration pro-
cedure for α for the known model M0. The corre-
sponding calibrated values of α(γ, n,M0) are given
in Table III.
Using the calibrated values of α we then compute
n γ = 0.01 γ = 0.05 γ = 0.50
2 0.9944(5) 0.973(1) 0.781(2)
3 0.9938(6) 0.969(1) 0.692(3)
4 0.9935(6) 0.967(2) 0.654(4)
5 0.9933(7) 0.966(2) 0.633(4)
6 0.9932(7) 0.965(2) 0.618(4)
7 0.9931(7) 0.965(2) 0.607(4)
8 0.9929(7) 0.964(2) 0.600(4)
9 0.9928(7) 0.963(2) 0.593(4)
10 0.9928(7) 0.963(2) 0.588(5)
TABLE III: Values of α(γ, n,M0), as a function of the
number of data points, n, ensuring an average fraction of
false doubt of γ = 1%, 5%, 50% and for the known model
M0. The number in brackets denotes the uncertainty in
the last digit.
the posterior doubt on M0. The result is shown in
Fig. 5 (again averaged over 1000 realizations). We
can see that doubt increases immediately from its
prior value p(X ) = 10−5, and tends very quickly to
1. This clearly signals the inadequacy of the known
model to fit the data. We should therefor question
the correctness of the known model and suspect the
existence of a better model. Therefore our procedure
leads to model discovery in the absence of an explicit
specification of the alternative, true model.
D. Generalisation to multi-models cases and
discussion
In the example considered so far, we have only
dealt with doubt (or its absence) for one model at
a time. The situation is qualitatively similar when
several alternative known models are available (i.e.
for N > 1).
When several known models exist, the calibration
procedure should be carried out on the model that
is currently the best among them, i.e. on the model
with the largest Bayes factor. This ensures that the
probability of false doubt is under control for the
currently favoured model (which has the largest ev-
idence). If one of the known models is clearly pre-
ferred, then the situation is qualitatively similar to
the case of N = 1 (since the evidence from the other,
poorer models contributes very little to the sum in
the definition of doubt). If instead several models
have a similar value of the evidence under present
data, then it is expected that the outcome of the
calibration should be quite similar for any of them.
Also, as discussed above in the presence of M mod-
els with approximately the same evidence there is an
extra “volume factor” M/N to take into account in
9FIG. 5: Model discovery: posterior doubt on the (wrong)
model M0 as a function of the number of data points,
n, here for prior doubt p(X ) = 10−5 using the value of
α calibrated to a fraction of false doubt γ = 1% (solid
blue line), γ = 5% (dashed red line), γ = 50% (dotted
black line). The points give the mean doubt over 1000
data realizations and the vertical bars indicate the range
of values enclosing 95% of the realizations. The poste-
rior doubt goes very quickly to 1 (in fact, for n ≥ 5, all
realizations have a posterior doubt of unity), therefore
leading to doubt the correctness of the model.
the rate of false doubt.
The false doubt calibration procedure introduced
here insures against unjustified doubt of the known
models at a given threshold (set by γ). Because un-
known models belong to the world of unknown un-
knowns, it is more difficult to calibrate the perfor-
mance of doubt for model discovery, i.e. for justi-
fiably doubting false models. Whether or not the
doubt does increase when the true model is genuinely
unknown depends on how different that unknown
true model is from the known models. Here, “differ-
ent” must be interpreted in terms of a “distance” in
the space of models, as measured by the Bayesian ev-
idence. In this sense, the notion of doubt introduces
an absolute metric in model space, to complement
the relative metric represented by the Bayes factor.
In any case, if the true model is not very different in
its observational consequences from one of the known
models (in which case doubt will not increase), then
one might conclude that the known model is a phe-
nomenologically accurate description of the presently
available data. If doubt does increase, though, this
is a signal that the best available model is an inad-
equate description of the observations and that new
theoretical input is required.
In general, we remark that the existence of known
models that are unnecessarily complex (i.e., with
more free parameters than the true model) is not di-
rectly addressed by doubt. In this case, an analysis of
doubt (properly calibrated) will return a null result,
i.e. no reason for doubting the adequacy of the overly
complex model. One has to keep in mind that doubt
is a tool for model discovery, whose primarily goal is
to point towards the need to enlarge (or change com-
pletely) the space of the known models. The shed-
ding of unnecessary levels of complexity is instead a
task best accomplished by simultaneously analysing
the evidence and Bayesian complexity. (See [3] for
an application.)
Finally, the usual caveats apply about the depen-
dence on the volume in parameter space enclosed
by the parameters’ prior p(θj |Mj), as is always the
case for calculations involving the Bayesian evidence.
(See [1, 17] for a discussion.) However, the calibra-
tion procedure for α automatically accounts for the
volume enclosed by the chosen prior under Mj , as
compared with the reference prior employed for the
unknown model. If one were to change the prior on
the parameters of the known model, then this would
amount effectively to a change of model. (As men-
tioned, we consider a model specification to consist of
both the model parameters and their prior.) There-
fore the calibration ought to be performed again on
the new model.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Checking the appropriateness of a given set of
models to describe observations is not a usual task
in a Bayesian framework. We have suggested an
intuitive approach to doubt in a Bayesian context
that shares some philosophy with the frequentist ap-
proach: after all, the estimator for Lmax is based on
a χ2/dof argument and strictly speaking, Bayesians
should show little interest in the hypothetical out-
come of different realizations of reality. Neverthe-
less, as we demonstrated with the example of a sim-
ple linear model, the concept of doubt is more pow-
erful than traditional goodness–of–fit tests provided
the parameter α controlling the rate of false doubt is
correctly calibrated.
As mentioned in the introduction, the concept of
doubt is ideally suited for applications in cosmol-
ogy. Huge data sets and multi-dimensional parame-
ter spaces do not lend themselves very well to visual
inspection. Computing the doubt D – a single num-
ber – gives an indication of the trustworthiness of
the model(s) under consideration in a Bayesian con-
text. Applications range from questions about the
very early inflationary phase of the universe (in par-
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ticular about the shape of the primordial power spec-
trum generated during inflation) to the future evolu-
tion of the Universe which appears to be dominated
by dark energy (in particular whether the equation
of state during late–time acceleration is constant).
Given the need to calibrate the doubt, such work re-
quires a large amount of computational power even
given recent advances in numerical techniques for the
evaluation of the evidence, and it will be addressed
in a future paper.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Pietro Berkes, Francesc
Ferrer, Andrew Jaffe, Irit Maor and John Ruhl for
stimulating discussions. R.T. was partially sup-
ported by the Royal Astronomical Society through
the Sir Norman Lockyer Fellowship, by the Science
and Technology Facilities Council (UK) and by St
Anne’s College, Oxford. R.T. would like to thank
CERCA for the hospitality in the early phases of this
work. G.D.S and P.M.V. are supported by a grant
from the DOE to the particle astrophysics group at
CWRU. P.M.V. is supported by the office of the Dean
of the College of Arts and Science at CWRU.
[1] R. Trotta, Contemporary Physics. 49, 71 (2008),
arXiv:0803.4089 [astro-ph].
[2] D. Huterer and G. Starkman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 90,
031301 (2003), astro-ph/0207517.
[3] M. Kunz, R. Trotta, and D. Parkinson, Phys. Rev.
D74, 023503 (2006), astro-ph/0602378.
[4] A. R. Liddle et al., (2007), astro-ph/0703285.
[5] G. Efstathiou, Mon. Not. Roy. Astron. Soc. 388,
1314 (2008), arXiv:0802.3185 [astro-ph].
[6] C. Gordon and R. Trotta, Mon. Not. Roy. Astron.
Soc. 382, 1859 (2007), arXiv:0706.3014 [astro-ph].
[7] R. Trotta, Mon. Not. Roy. Astron. Soc. 378, 72
(2007), astro-ph/0504022.
[8] A. F. Heavens, T. D. Kitching, and L. Verde, Mon.
Not. Roy. Astron. Soc. 380, 1029 (2007), astro-
ph/0703191.
[9] P. Mukherjee, D. Parkinson, and A. R. Liddle, As-
trophys. J. 638, L51 (2006), astro-ph/0508461.
[10] F. Feroz and M. P. Hobson, Mon. Not. Roy. Astron.
Soc. 384, 449 (2007), arXiv:0704.3704.
[11] F. Feroz, M. P. Hobson, and M. Bridges, (2008),
arXiv:0809.3437 [astro-ph].
[12] E. T. Jaynes, Probability Theory. The logic of sci-
ence (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK,
2003).
[13] G. Schwarz, Ann. Statist. 6, 461 (1978).
[14] A. Raftery, Sociological Methodology 25, 111 (1995).
[15] A. R. Liddle, Mon. Not. Roy. Astron. Soc. 351, L49
(2004), astro-ph/0401198.
[16] A. R. Liddle, Mon. Not. Roy. Astron. Soc. Lett. 377,
L74 (2007), astro-ph/0701113.
[17] R. Trotta, Mon, Not. R. Astron. Soc. 375, L26
(2007), astro-ph/0608116.
[18] Strictly speaking, this procedure underestimates the
uncertainty in the spread of values for the doubt,
in that it ignores the current posterior uncertainty
about θˆ. Such an approximation will be valid when-
ever the scale of the posterior width is much smaller
than the width of the prior on the model’s parame-
ters (i.e., for informative data). A fuller calculation
accounting for this extra layer of complexity will be
presented elsewhere.
